

The Treaties of the War
of the Spanish Succession
An Historical and Critical Dictionary

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A Note to the User

This dictionary is designed to make accessible to the scholar as well as the student the recent scholarship on the treaties of the War of the Spanish Succession, known as the Pacification of Utrecht. Because it is impossible to include every battle, individual, and treaty, we solicited the advice of experts from around the world and selected individuals, places, and events who or which played a crucial role in the war and influenced the denouement. The battle of Elixhem (1705), although an allied success, was strategically indecisive and therefore was not included. In contrast, the battle of Blenheim* (1704), a crucial allied victory that saved Vienna from a Franco-Bavarian invasion and forced Bavaria out of the war, was included. Of the many conventions, agreements, treaties, accords, and accessions signed during the war, we have chosen the most important. The accession of the Circle of the Lower Rhine-Westphalia to the Grand Alliance (1702) is not as critical as the elector of Bavaria's* alliance with France (1702) or the duke of Savoy's* defection from France and adherence to the allied cause (1703). Although both Heister* and Bussy-Rabutin helped to suppress the Hungarian insurrection, Heister played the more significant and repressive role.

The dictionary is arranged alphabetically. Cross references are noted in the text with an asterisk and also are listed at the end of an entry. Wherever possible, major works are cited after the entry. Unfortunately, in many cases no published work is available. Standard biographical dictionaries are not included. Names commonly Anglicized are given their English spelling. An exclusive chronology and a genealogical chart will aid the reader.

Although we have not been able to reprint the major treaties and conventions, we have included in the bibliography references to the definitive *Consolidated Treaty Series* or some other generally accessible source.

Dates are given in New Style. In the early modern period dates were given in both Old Style and New Style. The refusal of England and most of Protestant

Europe to accept the Gregorian calendar reform of 1582 meant that for most of Protestant Europe, in the seventeenth century the dates in the Old Style (O.S.) were ten days, and in the eighteenth century, eleven days, behind the New Style (N.S.) To further confuse matters, the Old Style calendar began the year on 25 March, not 1 January.

Introduction

The Peace of Utrecht was “like the Peace of God, beyond human understanding.”¹

Many then, and more since, would heartily endorse Charles Mordaunt,* earl of Peterborough’s famous quip. The peace treaties of the War of the Spanish Succession, often collectively termed the Pacification of Utrecht,* dealt with the issue that had begun the war: the question of who would succeed the king of Spain, the childless Carlos II.* Nervous, weak, and melancholy, he and many others believed that the devil possessed him; thus the sobriquet Carlos the Bewitched. As a sixth-generation Habsburg, Carlos was the product of excessive inbreeding. Epileptic fits, convulsions, fainting spells, ulcers, and congenital syphilis, a direct result of his father’s promiscuity, plagued him during his short life, as did the question of who would inherit his vast empire. Various attempts to settle the issue through the so-called Partition Treaties,* which divided the lands among the candidates—the Electoral Prince Joseph Ferdinand of Bavaria;* Philippe d’Anjou (later Philip V*), the French claimant; and Archduke Charles (later Emperor Charles VI*), the Austrian claimant—had only succeeded in alienating and angering the Spanish. In a desperate attempt to pass his empire on intact to his successor, Carlos II concluded that only France had the ability to defend Spain and her far-flung dominions, and thus willed his empire to the French candidate, the future Philip V.*

Shortly after Carlos’s death (November 1700), Louis XIV* accepted the will on behalf of his grandson. That acceptance and the ensuing struggle over the inheritance triggered “the tragedy that followed,” in the words of Henry St. John* viscount Bolingbroke.² Leopold I* of Austria immediately dispatched one of his ablest commanders, Prince Eugene of Savoy,* to Italy in the spring of 1701, and joined with the English and the Dutch in the Second Grand Alliance.* Unfortunately, as the war was to prove, little united the allies except fear

of French hegemony, which threatened the balance of power.* Austria, England, and the United Provinces formally declared war against France in May 1702. Most of the Holy Roman Empire, many of the Italian princes, Portugal, and Savoy soon joined the allies. In spite of intensive negotiations, Louis gained the support only of Max Emanuel,* elector of Bavaria, and Joseph Clemens,* archbishop of Cologne, and a few other minor powers. Few expected that this tragedy would drag on for thirteen years. During that time the diplomatically nimble would switch sides and the war aims would change.

The war was fought in both the Old World and the New World: in Spain, in Portugal, in the Holy Roman Empire, in France, in Italy, in the Netherlands, and in North and South America. Uprisings by the Hungarians under Rákóczi,* the Camisards,* the Vaudois,* the Tyrolese, and the Bavarians deflected men and money from the war effort, as did the civil war in Spain. On the allied side, the formidable duo of John Churchill* and Prince Eugene of Savoy faced some of France's most able soldiers, including Marshal Villars.* As the conflict wore on, those who advocated peace—whether in Great Britain, the United Provinces, France, or the Holy Roman Empire—became more vocal and more powerful. In Great Britain the 1710 election meant the fall of the Whigs* and the accession of the Tories, who were determined to end the war. Negotiations had been in progress since 1706—or, one could argue, even before the war began, with the secret Partition Treaty of 1668—but by 1710 the British were more willing to negotiate with their enemies and more willing to abandon their allies.

The Pacification of Utrecht may be considered the last in the series of partition treaties and brought the war to a close. It encompassed twenty-three treaties and conventions signed from January 1713 through February 1715, including Rastatt* (7 March 1714) and Baden* (7 September 1714). Austria and Spain did not conclude peace until 1725. Just as the issue had taken decades to resolve, so the congress took months to decide.

Compono, impono, concludo, illudo. Quid inde?
 Conclusum, illusum, compositum, impositum.
 Finis principio similis, sic ordo vagatur. . . .³

(I compose, impose, conclude, ridicule. What next?
 Concluded, ridiculed, composed, imposed.
 The end [is] like the beginning, so wanders the order.)

This little ditty penned by a German minister lampooned the proceedings at Utrecht and underlined what some knew and others suspected: that the negotiations merely legitimated decisions that had been, or were being, reached in London or Paris. The proceedings at Utrecht reinforced the illusion of collective bargaining and of allied unanimity, which the British had been at pains to create through the disingenuous disavowals of Robert Harley,* first earl of Oxford, and the brusque and brilliant bullying of Bolingbroke. That illusion masked the cynical abandonment of the allies. The British policy of bypassing the allies continued during the negotiations, but had begun before the congress had even

convened. Harley and Charles Talbot,* duke of Shrewsbury, had been communicating with Jean Baptiste Colbert, marquis de Torcy,* since August 1710, when Abbé Gaultier* contacted Shrewsbury through Edward Villiers, earl of Jersey, and suggested a rapprochement between France and Britain.

The election of October 1710 made that realignment possible; it had radically altered the diplomatic landscape by ending the Whig domination of the House of Commons. The majority of the Tories disliked the strategy of the war and the extension of its purpose. Their chief platform against the Whigs had been the needless prolongation of the war and the necessity of peace. Bolingbroke, in a retrospective justification, argued that the war had become “a war of passion, of ambition, of avarice, and of private interest,” and that the country should be delivered “from the necessity of bearing any longer so unequal a part in so unnecessary a war.”⁴ After the battles of Brihuega* and Villa Viciosa* in December 1710, many in the ministry were resigned to peace without Spain. The secret negotiations with France postponed the problems of allied concurrence, and the British continued to maintain the illusion, the tragicomedy of allied cooperation. On 22 April 1711 Torcy signed a paper embodying the British proposals, and on 28 April Gaultier returned to London with it. The pretense was maintained that France was submitting “spontaneous” offers to Britain, whereas in fact the offers were dictated by London.

Shrewsbury, increasingly uneasy about the way the negotiations were being conducted, argued in August 1711 that the British were leaving themselves open to the charge of abandoning their allies, that the proceedings looked “like bargaining for yourselves apart and leaving your friends to shift at a general treaty.”⁵ He refused to sign the Mesnager* articles: “I must desire to be excused putting my hand to that agreement.”⁶ Despite Shrewsbury’s qualms, by October the preliminaries had been agreed on by London and Versailles; one set detailed the concessions to be made to Britain by France and Spain and was to be kept secret, the second contained only a very general statement of terms and was to be made public. The London preliminaries set the basic outline of the peace. Not surprisingly, the Dutch found the French offers too “general” and too “obscure” to serve as a basis for the negotiations, and pressed for specific preliminaries before the congress opened.⁷ The hectoring of Thomas Strafford,* Baron Raby, the British ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the United Provinces, finally persuaded the Dutch to name the city of Utrecht as the site of the congress and to send passports to the French on 21 November. The violent antipathy of Bolingbroke toward the queen’s “obstinate, ungrateful” allies⁸ and his intention to sign a separate peace fueled allied charges at the time, and Whig allegations later, of betrayal and treachery. Bolingbroke’s ruthlessness wrecked the Grand Alliance, embittered the Dutch, and alienated the emperor. In the proceedings that followed, Bolingbroke proved, in Trevelyan’s words, that he “had a keener sense for his country’s interests than for her faith and honor.”⁹

Ironically, Bolingbroke himself argued that “the conferences of Utrecht when